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Abstract 
 
 
It has been well established that the wages of individual workers react little, especially downwards, 
to shocks that hit their employer. This paper presents new evidence from a unique survey of firms 
across Europe on the prevalence of downward wage rigidity in both real and nominal terms. We 
analyse which firm-level and institutional factors are associated with wage rigidity. Our results 
indicate that it is related to workforce composition at the establishment level in a manner that is 
consistent with related theoretical models (e.g. efficiency wage theory, insider-outsider theory). We 
also find that wage rigidity depends on the labour market institutional environment. Collective 
bargaining coverage is positively related with downward real wage rigidity, measured on the basis 
of wage indexation. Downward nominal wage rigidity is positively associated with the extent of 
permanent contracts and this effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection 
regulations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The success of central banks in achieving price stability during the last two decades has 
renewed the academic interest in the cost of low inflation. Following Tobin (1972), if workers 
resist nominal wage cuts a rate of inflation that is too low might result in higher 
unemployment, since increases in the price level facilitate relative wage adjustments. A 
sizeable literature identifies substantial resistance to nominal wage cuts in the US.
1 The 
European evidence, led by the International Wage Flexibility Project (Dickens et al., 2007) 
suggests lower levels of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) than those observed in 
the US, but higher resistance to real wage cuts, a feature labelled downward real wage rigidity 
(DRWR). While the behavioural determinants of DNWR have been extensively studied in the 
literature
2 little is known about DRWR. Similarly, there is little evidence regarding the 
characteristics of firms that are typically associated with each type of rigidity. 
The aim of the current article is to analyse the incidence and causes of downward nominal and 
real wage rigidity. For this purpose, we use a novel major firm-level survey that contains 
detailed qualitative information for 15 EU countries. The survey was carried out within the 
framework of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), a research network sponsored by a 
consortium of central banks of the EU and coordinated by the European Central Bank. The 
sampling and stratification (discussed in the next section) was designed to be representative at 
the country level, and the questionnaire was harmonised across countries. This is the first 
firm-level survey with a harmonised design covering a large number of countries including 
detailed information on the extent of wage rigidities.  
Using an extensive micro-level survey has several advantages for our purposes. Most 
importantly, it allows us to examine the relevance of firm characteristics in the determination 
of rigidities, exploiting information that is usually unobservable in administrative and 
household data previously used in the literature. Moreover, the coverage of a large number of 
sectors and countries enables us to assess the importance of product and labour market 
characteristics in the determination of nominal versus real rigidities. Previous research, based 
on aggregate or sectoral data, has demonstrated that the institutional environment, e.g. the 
characteristics and coverage of collective bargaining or the extent of employment protection, 
is significantly correlated with wage rigidity (Dickens et al., 2007; Holden and Wulfsberg, 
2007 and 2008). We benefit from the detailed firm-level information available to us to extend 
                                                 
1 See among others Blinder and Choi (1990), Kahn (1997), Card and Hyslop (1997), Altonji and 
Devereux (1999) and Lebow et al. (2003). 
2 See e.g. Blinder and Choi (1990), Bewley (1994), Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2003) and Campbell 
and Kamlani (1997). 
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this analysis in examining the specific features of the institutional environment in which the 
firm operates, e.g. the extent of product market competition and characteristics of wage 
bargaining. 
  
The measures of wage rigidity used in the current study are closely related to alternative 
indicators derived on the basis of the wage change distribution observed at the individual 
level (see e.g. Dickens et al., 2007). We define downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) on 
the basis of nominal wage freezes. Firms freezing nominal wages at any point during the five-
year period prior to the survey are considered to be subject to nominal wage rigidity. Our 
measure of downward real wage rigidity is defined on the basis of wage indexation. We 
consider as subject to downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) those firms that have an 
automatic link between wages and past or expected inflation. Note that this is a narrower 
concept of real wage rigidity in comparison to the earlier research that derives wage rigidity 
measures on the basis of wage change distributions. Dickens et al. (2008) have shown that in 
many cases real wages are rigid but the focal point is different from expected or realised 
inflation. This pattern in the wage change distribution is consistent with wage indexation if 
firms have imperfect foresight. However, it can also result from a part of firms following the 
inflation rate in their wage-setting decisions, but not having a formal rule that links nominal 
wage changes to inflation. In spite of the noted differences, we will show in Section 2 that our 
measures of wage rigidity are highly correlated with the measures derived by earlier studies.  
 
We employ multinomial logit regressions to analyse how DNWR and DRWR relate to a 
number of firm-level and institutional characteristics of labour markets in the countries 
covered by our sample. Employing this methodology makes it possible to assess these 
relationships simultaneously for both types of rigidities. Although a given firm can in 
principle be subject to both types of downward rigidity, in practice this cannot be observed, 
i.e. we cannot simultaneously observe that a firm freezes real wages and in addition avoids 
nominal wage cuts. This implies that cross-sectional sector- and country-level measures of 
nominal and real wage rigidity are negatively correlated. Given this interdependence and the 
fact that both types of rigidities are influenced by a set of variables that overlaps to a large 
extent, the estimated coefficients can be biased if these relationships are assessed separately 
for DNWR and DRWR. Using the multinomial logit regression method enables us to 
overcome this problem.  
 
We find that the incidence of both types of wage rigidity is quite substantial in Europe – 
approximately 10% of firms experienced wage freezes and 17% of firms applied wage 
indexation mechanisms. The incidence of wage freezes implies that downward nominal wage 
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rigidity is more common in non-euro area economies, whereas indexation mechanisms are 
more widely used in the euro-area countries included in our sample. Our regression results 
indicate that collective bargaining coverage is positively related with real wage rigidity, while 
the estimated relationship with nominal wage rigidity is insignificant. A possible 
interpretation of this finding is that unions have the capacity to provide their members with 
information about inflation expectations and explain the importance of maintaining the real 
income level to workers (Dickens et al., 2007). Thus, union coverage reduces the prevalence 
of money illusion. DNWR instead is higher in countries where firing is costly due to 
employment protection legislation provisions and within firms with a higher share of workers 
holding open-ended contracts. This is consistent with Holden (2002), who shows that when 
renegotiation of contracts requires mutual consent, employment protection provisions increase 
the bargaining power of insiders, who have then a strategic advantage in imposing nominal 
wage increases even when firms want to cut wages. 
 
Our regression results also show that wages of high-skilled white-collar workers are more 
rigid than those of blue-collar and low-skilled white-collar workers. This holds for both 
downward nominal and real rigidity and is in line with the predictions of standard labour 
market theories. Firms may be reluctant to cut wages of workers whose effort is less easily 
monitored or those with high replacement costs to avoid them reducing their effort or leaving 
the firm. These characteristics are typical for high-skilled white-collar workers. Our finding of 
higher real and nominal wage rigidity for this occupational group is consistent with 
Campbell’s (1997) results. Using macroeconomic data for the US, he finds that wages of 
more skilled workers, and in particular white-collar workers, are less responsive to 
fluctuations in unemployment. It is also consistent with the findings by Franz and Pfeiffer 
(2006), who examine the determinants of wage rigidity in Germany. The implications of other 
firm characteristics, including size and tenure structure, and the importance of product market 
competition, are also discussed in the text. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the main characteristics of 
the survey and definitions of wage rigidities. Section 3 presents some theoretical predictions 
regarding the impact of firm characteristics and institutions on rigidity, and discusses previous 
findings in the empirical literature. Section 4 concentrates on the survey evidence regarding 
wage freezes and indexation practices. Section 5 examines how nominal and real wage 
rigidities are related to various firm-level characteristics and institutional measures. Section 6 
concludes and draws policy implications. 
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2. Survey design and definitions of wage rigidities 
2.1. Survey design 
 
The analysis in the current paper is based on a survey of firms conducted between the second 
half of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008 in 15 European Union countries: Austria, Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.
3 The survey was carried out by the National 
Central Banks and all countries used as the basis for the survey a harmonised questionnaire 
developed in the context of the Eurosystem Wage Dynamics Network, a research network 
analysing wage and labour cost dynamics. The harmonised questionnaire contained a core set 
of questions referring to the firms’ wage-setting strategies, which was included in all 
countries’ questionnaires. The harmonised questionnaire was further adapted by some 
countries to account for specific country characteristics and differences in institutional 
framework. As a result, some countries opted for shorter versions of this questionnaire, while 
others extended it in several dimensions.  
 
Appendix 1 gives an overview of the main characteristics of the national surveys. The sample 
frame in each country was based on firms with at least 5 employees. The sectors covered are 
manufacturing, energy, construction, market services, non-market services, trade and financial 
intermediation; there are, however, some differences in the sectoral coverage of individual 
countries. The sample covers around 15,300 firms  representing around 47.5 million 
employees. A description of the distribution of the sample by country, sector and size is 
provided in Appendix 2. In order to make the results representative of the total population the 
cross-country statistics presented in the following sections use employment-adjusted weights. 
For each firm/observation these weights indicate the number of employees each observation 
represents in the population. They can be calculated as the population employment divided by 
the number of firms (in each stratum) in the realised sample.
4 Appendix 3 gives a detailed 
description of the construction of the employment-based weights.
5  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The survey was conducted either by traditional mail, phone and face-to-face interviews or through the 
internet. Germany also conducted the survey, but with a different questionnaire (Radowski and Bonin, 
2009). Hence, it is not included in the sample.  
4 For most of the cases the stratification is based on sector and firm size; some countries also used 
region as an additional stratum. 
5 The employment-adjusted weights account for the unequal probabilities of receiving and responding 
to the questionnaire across strata as well as for the average firm size (measured on the basis of number 
of employees) in the population in each stratum.  
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2.2. Definitions of downward nominal and real wage rigidity 
 
In the literature, wage rigidities are consensually referred to as (obstacles to) the speed or the 
amount with which wages adjust to changes in warranted real wages – real wage rigidity – 
and to changes in prices – nominal wage rigidity (see e.g. Blanchard, 2006). In this paper, 
rigidity refers to obstacles to wage adjustment, rather than to infrequent adjustment or 
stickiness of wages. Most often, the obstacles to wage flexibility prevent nominal or real 
wages from being adjusted downwards. We asked firms about wage freezes and indexation 
mechanisms, which we relate to downward nominal and real wage rigidity respectively, as 
argued below. 
 
The measures of downward nominal and real wage rigidity used in the current study are 
closely related to the indicators which are derived on the basis of individual wage change 
distributions observed in household survey and administrative data (see e.g. Dickens et al., 
2007). Our survey asked if firms have ever cut or frozen wages during the past five years. 
Firms were instructed to answer the wage-setting questions with reference to their main 
occupational group, defined earlier in the survey. Following the information on wage freezes, 
we regard firms that froze wages at any point as showing evidence of downward nominal 
wage rigidity.  
 
We also asked firms if they had a policy that linked wage changes to inflation. Firms that 
replied yes to this question were further asked if the link with inflation was automatic or 
discretionary and whether the link was with past or expected inflation. Using information 
from these questions, we consider as subject to downward real wage rigidity those firms that 
have an automatic link between wages and past or expected inflation, i.e. who apply 
automatic wage indexation. The idea here is that workers not just resist nominal wage cuts but 
rather defend their real wages. They can do this through focusing collective bargaining on 
some measure of inflation, a practice that can be institutionalised by indexation mechanisms 
that link wages automatically to inflation. 
 
Strictly speaking, our survey-based measures of real wage rigidity and nominal wage rigidity 
do not capture only downward wage rigidity. Due to various reasons mainly related to ‘menu 
costs’, a wage freeze can indicate upward as well as downward wage rigidity. For example, 
Elsby (2009) develops a model where he demonstrates that if firms are not able to cut nominal 
wages then they react to this constraint by compressing wage increases, i.e. downward rigidity 
imposes also upward rigidity in nominal wages. However, Dickens et al. (2007) show on the 
basis of 31 different datasets from 16 countries that a large spike at zero in the wage change 
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distribution is usually accompanied by a low incidence of wage changes below this point, 
while there is little or no evidence of a similar lack of mass at small wage increases. This 
clearly suggests that most of the observed nominal wage freezes reflect downward rigidity. 
We should note that the prevalence of wage cuts in the survey that the current study is based 
o n i s a l s o  e x t r e m e l y  r a r e .  O n l y  2 . 3 % o f s a m p l e d f i r m s c u t b a s e w a g e s o f a t  l e a s t s o m e 
employees during the five-year period prior to the survey, while 9.6% of firms froze base 
wages.
6  
 
In theory, wage indexation could also impose upward rigidity in addition to downward 
rigidity. Indeed, if firms are equally likely to be hit by positive and negative economic shocks 
then the rigidity imposed by wage indexation might be symmetric. However, indexation 
mechanisms are generally disconnected from the wage-bargaining calendar and present an 
asymmetric structure. As an example, in a country like Belgium, where wage indexation is 
most prevalent, real wage increases due to tenure or performance are negotiated and 
implemented. Independently from this, wages are automatically indexed either at fixed points 
in time or with fixed amounts of 2%.
7 In Spain, the common indexation clauses are 
independent of other wage increases and only apply upward. We conjecture from this that our 
indexation-based measure of real wage rigidity more probably reflects downward rather than 
upward rigidity. 
 
To validate the use of the survey-based measures of downward nominal and real wage rigidity 
presented here, we compared our measures with the ones obtained by earlier studies in this 
area. It appears that the indicators defined in the current study are highly correlated with 
measures of downward nominal and real wage rigidity that are derived from household 
surveys and administrative data on individuals on the basis of the observed wage change 
distributions. The correlation between the country indicators in Dickens et al. (2007) and the 
country averages of our indicators is 0.68 for nominal and 0.61 for real wage rigidity.
8 
Messina et al. (2009) report measures of DNWR and DRWR for 13 sectors in 3 of our 
countries: Belgium, Spain and Portugal. We have tabulated our measures of rigidity for those 
sectors and computed the correlations with the average rigidity in each sector and country 
during the 2000s from Messina et al. (2009). The correlation of sector averages is 0.82 for 
downward nominal and 0.86 for downward real wage rigidity. The high correlations in the 
case of downward real wage rigidity either indicate that this type of wage rigidity is to a large 
                                                 
6 The employment-weighted average share of workers who experienced wage cuts was 0.8%.  
7 Recently however, all-in clauses have been included in a limited number of agreements, making real 
wage increases conditional on the difference between expected inflation and ex post indexation. 
8 Evaluated for six countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Portugal. 
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extent caused by wage indexation, or that other forces behind the resistance of real wages to 
adjust downwards are highly correlated with the indexation phenomenon studied here.  
 
3. Discussion of related theories and previous empirical findings 
 
Several prominent labour market theories (e.g. efficiency wage, insider-outsider and contract 
theories) imply predictions regarding the degree of rigidity for different categories of workers 
and firms. In the following, we discuss the implications of various theoretical models for the 
likely incidence of rigidities across firms depending on the occupational structure, workforce 
tenure, the type of work contract typically used (permanent vs temporary) and production 
technology.  
 
According to the efficiency wage theory, workers’ productivity (effort) depends positively on 
their wage, and hence firms might refrain from cutting wages because it could reduce profits. 
There are several possible explanations why productivity might depend on wages. In the 
shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), a cut in earnings lowers the cost of job loss, 
thereby inducing more workers to shirk. In the gift-exchange model (Akerlof, 1982) and the 
fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), a fall in earnings leads to lower 
gratitude and loyalty to the firm, again reducing effort. Because the effort of high-skilled 
workers is difficult to monitor and more valuable (in terms of value added), especially for 
high-skilled white-collar jobs, firms may be more reluctant to cut their wages, which leads to 
the prediction that their wages are more rigid. 
 
The relative wage level influences not only productivity but also the propensity of employees 
to quit. Wage cuts might increase the turnover of employees and have a negative impact on 
profitability. In the turnover model of Stiglitz (1974), firms that cut wages will experience 
more job quits and incur higher costs of hiring and training new workers. Since the training 
and hiring costs are typically higher for white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers, the 
turnover model predicts higher wage rigidity for the former. The turnover model also predicts 
that firms with high turnover costs invest in creation of long-term bonds with their employees 
(e.g. in the form of the implicit contracts of Lazear, 1979). If successful, such firms would 
exhibit higher average tenure. Hence, we expect to find a higher degree of rigidity among 
firms with higher average workforce tenure, all else equal. Similarly, when applying the 
adverse selection model of Weiss (1980) to quits, the most productive workers are most likely 
to quit their job after a wage cut. As white-collar workers are more difficult and costly to 
replace due to their specialised skills, firms are less willing to cut their wages, leading to 
higher wage rigidity. 
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According to the insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988), firms do not dismiss 
their current workers and replace them by job-seekers at lower wages because insiders can 
harass or refuse to cooperate with newly hired entrants. This implies that workers with higher 
tenure and/or permanent work contracts have more power in the wage-setting process than 
recently hired and/or temporary employees, which leads to higher wage rigidity for tenured 
employees and workers with permanent contracts. The productivity of white-collar workers is 
typically more directly linked to their integration into the work process (e.g. because blue-
collar workers at an assembly line do not need much cooperation with other workers while 
teamwork is common for white-collar workers). As a result, the model predicts that white-
collar workers exhibit a higher degree of wage rigidity than blue-collar workers.  
 
In summary, all the theories discussed above predict higher wage rigidity for high-skilled 
and/or white-collar workers. Most reviewed models (various models related to the efficiency 
wage theory, the firm-specific human capital model, the insider-outsider theory and the 
contract theory) predict that workers with higher tenure and permanent workers have more 
rigid wages. The impact of the workforce composition on DNWR and DRWR has been 
empirically investigated for the US by Campbell (1997) and for Belgium by Du Caju et al. 
(2009). Both studies report lower wage rigidity for blue-collar workers as opposed to white-
collar workers. Du Caju et al. (2007) find higher rigidity in firms with low quit rates in 
Belgium, which implies a positive relationship between tenure and wage rigidity.  
 
Another firm characteristic that is likely to affect wage rigidity is production technology. We 
expect workers in firms operating with labour-intensive technologies to have more leeway in 
wage negotiations. So, on the basis of the reasons analogous to the ones implied by the 
insider-outsider theory, we can expect that the more labour-intensive is the technology the 
more rigid are wages. On the other hand, the reciprocity theory developed inter alia by Rabin 
(1993) would imply the opposite. According to the reciprocity theory, workers are very 
sensitive to wage cuts, because these are considered to be “unfriendly acts” or “punishments”. 
As Howitt (2002) argues, one of the consequences of the reciprocity theory can be that wage 
cuts are less likely to occur if labour costs make up a smaller share of firms’ total costs, the 
reason being that the direct increase in profit from the reduction in unit labour costs will be 
smaller relative to the damage that a disgruntled workforce can inflict on the firm’s profit. 
 
One of the institutional features that is likely to play a crucial role regarding wage rigidity is 
the (de)centralisation of wage setting and coverage of union contracts. Various theoretical 
models predict that the bargaining power of labour unions is positively related with wage 
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rigidity. For example, models developed by Dunlop (1944), Shishter (1943) and Oswald 
(1986) assume that the unions try to maximise the total wage payments of their members, not 
taking into account the negative effect that excessive wage increases can have on 
employment. As a result, wages are downward rigid. The structure of wage setting is also 
likely to play an important role. One might expect unions negotiating at the firm level to be 
more flexible at the time of accepting wage cuts in exchange for the maintenance of 
employment when business conditions turn bad. In the theoretical model of Holden (2002), 
employment protection legislation (EPL) increases wage rigidity. Holden discusses that in the 
case of collectively negotiated wage agreements, wage cuts need the mutual consent of 
employers and employees. Such cuts are less easily obtained if the threat of lay-off is more 
difficult to implement for the firm, e.g. because of strong EPL.  
 
In the empirical literature on wage rigidity, the above-described labour market institutions 
have been cited as the cause of differences in downward wage rigidity across countries. The 
studies by Dickens et al. (2007) and Holden and Wulfsberg (2007, 2008) find that higher 
wage rigidity is associated with higher union density. The former study finds a significant 
positive correlation between union density and real wage rigidity, whereas the latter studies 
imply that a positive relationship exists for both types of wage rigidity. Du Caju et al. (2009) 
in the case of Belgium and Messina et al. (2009) using individual data for four European 
countries also find that bargaining coverage is positively associated with real wage rigidity, 
but the latter finds no effect on DNWR. There is also some controversy in the literature 
regarding the role of EPL. On the one hand, Dickens et al. (2007) find that EPL indices are 
not significantly correlated with the country-level incidence of wage rigidity. On the other, 
Holden and Wulfsberg (2007, 2008) indicate a positive relationship between EPL and wage 
rigidity.  
 
 
4. Typology of firms subject to wage rigidities and institutional characteristics of the 
sampled countries 
4.1. The incidence of downward nominal and real wage rigidity in the sampled countries 
The survey used in the current article allows us to examine the extent of wage freezes in 15 
European Union member states. The data on wage indexation is available for 14 countries.
9 
Table 1 shows that indexation is much more prevalent in our data (17% of firms are affected) 
than wage freezes (only 10% of firms are affected), which is consistent with other evidence 
                                                 
9 The national questionnaire for the Netherlands did not include the section related to wage indexation. 
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on wage rigidity in most continental European countries, as opposed to the US and the UK 
(see e.g. Dickens et al., 2008). 
 
There are sizeable differences between the EU countries as regards the occurrence of wage 
freezes and the application of automatic indexation mechanisms. Wage freezes appear more 
common than average in the Czech Republic, Estonia and the Netherlands. They are 
considerably less common than average in Spain, Italy and Slovenia. Next, indexation 
mechanisms are especially prevalent in Belgium and Spain, whereas less than 5% of firms use 
indexation in Italy and Estonia. Overall, we find that the non-euro member states of the EU 
are more likely to experience wage freezes compared to the euro area member states, but that 
the reverse is true for indexation mechanisms. Note that almost all firms in Belgium apply 
automatic indexation mechanisms. This is caused by an institutionalised wage indexation 
process which covers all firms falling under the jurisdiction of a so-called “joint committee”, 
i.e. a sector-level bargaining unit where wage negotiations take place. In our sample, 98% of 
Belgian firms belong to one of the more than 100 joint committees. 
 
Table 1: Incidence of wage freezes and indexation mechanisms in sampled countries 
 
 
Country 
 Wage freezes 
(downward nominal wage 
rigidity) 
Indexation  
(downward real wage 
rigidity) 
Austria  0.133  0.098 
Belgium  0.118  0.982 
Czech Republic  0.265  0.117 
Estonia  0.217  0.044 
Spain  0.024  0.548 
France  0.071  0.096 
Greece  0.125  0.200 
Hungary  0.059  0.112 
Ireland  0.087  0.095 
Italy  0.039  0.017 
Lithuania  0.199  0.108 
Netherlands  0.232  N/A 
Poland  0.100  0.069 
Portugal  0.150  0.090 
Slovenia  0.029  0.235 
Total  0.096  0.167 
Euro area  0.082  0.201 
Non-euro area  0.134  0.085 
 
Note: Proportion of firms having frozen wages over the past five years and applying an automatic 
indexation mechanism. Figures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses.  
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4.2. Labour market institutions in the sampled countries 
 
 
The sample statistics presented in Table 1 indicate that there exist substantial differences in 
the incidence of wage rigidity across the sampled countries. A natural candidate for such 
cross-country variation in wage rigidity is the differences in the national labour market 
institutions. We explore the impact of the institutional environment in the regression analysis 
that is carried out in the subsequent section of this paper, focusing on two aspects: collective 
bargaining and employment protection legislation. In the following, we will give an overview 
of the differences in these institutional measures across countries.  
 
Our survey included three questions related to the collective bargaining of wages. Managers 
were asked if a collective wage agreement is applicable and if so, whether it is a firm-level 
agreement or a binding agreement that was negotiated at a level outside the firm (e.g. 
national, sector level, etc). In addition, the survey obtained data on the proportion of workers 
in the firms that is covered by any kind (inside or outside) of collective wage agreement. 
Table 2 summarises this information across countries, and complements it with aggregate data 
obtained from other sources, collected by Du Caju et al. (2008). Where comparisons are 
possible, this information is consistent at the aggregate level with existing institutional 
sources, such as an overview by the OECD (2004). We should note, however, that the 
measures of collective bargaining coverage presented in Table  2 refer to private sector 
enterprises only, whereas the measures from the above-mentioned sources are representative 
of the whole populations of workers in different countries.
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Although union membership rates have been declining in Europe, collective bargaining 
coverage is still high in general. The percentage of firms that apply some kind of collective 
wage agreement is very high in the euro area countries under consideration, compared to non-
euro area countries. Differences between euro area and non-euro area countries are also 
noticeable when one looks separately at collective agreements signed at different levels. 
Collective agreements signed outside the firm are the most common practice in the euro area 
countries, while firm-level agreements are more frequent in the non-euro area countries. In 
terms of the percentage of workers that are covered by some form of collective wage 
agreement, coverage is very high in the euro area countries. By contrast, non-euro area 
countries have low levels of coverage.  
 
In addition to cross-country measures of bargaining coverage, Table 2 gives an overview of 
strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL). The measures of EPL for all countries 
                                                 
10 Appendix 1 gives an overview of the main characteristics of the national surveys. 
11 
 
in our sample are based on two sources. EPL indices for EU-15 member states are based on 
OECD Employment Outlook (2004) and analogous indices for the new member states are 
based on Tonin (2005), which replicates the OECD methodology and covers all new member 
states that are present in our survey.  
 
 
Table 2: Collective bargaining coverage and strictness of employment protection 
 
Country 
Share of 
employees 
covered by 
collective 
bargaining 
agreements 
Share of 
firms having 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
Share of 
firms having 
firm-level 
bargaining 
agreement 
Share of 
firms having 
higher-level 
bargaining 
agreement 
EPL 
index 
Austria  0.946 (H)  0.978  0.233 (N)  0.962  2.15 
Belgium  0.893 (H)  0.994  0.353 (N)  0.979  2.50 
Czech  Republic  0.502  (M)  0.540  0.514 (D)  0.175  2.02 
Estonia  0.087 (L)  0.121  0.104 (D)  0.034  2.33 
Spain  0.968 (H)  1.000  0.169 (N)  0.831  3.07 
France  0.671 (M)  0.999  0.587 (D)  0.988  2.89 
Greece  0.910 (H)  0.934  0.208 (N)  0.859  2.90 
Hungary  0.184 (L)  0.190  0.190 (D)  0.000  1.65 
Ireland  0.422 (L)  0.724  0.313 (N)  0.683  1.32 
Italy  0.970 (H)  0.996  0.429 (N)  0.996  2.44 
Lithuania  0.156 (VL)  0.242  0.237 (D)  0.008  2.81 
Netherlands  0.676 (H)  0.755  0.301 (N)  0.454  2.27 
Poland  0.193 (VL)  0.229  0.214 (D)  0.047  2.22 
Portugal  0.555 (VL)  0.621  0.099 (N)  0.589  3.49 
Slovenia  N/A    (H)  1.000  0.257 (N)  0.743  2.63 
Total  0.678     .  0.764  0.330    .   0.655  2.50 
Euro area  0.845     .  0.942  0.356    .  0.873  2.63 
Non-euro area  0.241     .  0.277  0.263    .  0.060  2.15 
Note: Figures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. Total and euro area 
country aggregates exclude Germany. Country-level institutional information from Du Caju et al. 
(2008) between brackets: union coverage: VL = very low (0 to 25% of workers are covered by 
collective agreements), L = low (26 to 50%), M = moderate (51 to 75%), H = high (76 to 100%); firm-
level agreements: D = company level is dominant in the country, N = company level is not dominant in 
the country. 
 
 
4.3. Typology of firms according to wage rigidity 
 
We start by noting that our definitions of downward nominal and real wage rigidity are, in 
principle, mutually exclusive, i.e. a firm cannot be subject to both types of rigidity 
simultaneously. Nevertheless, a small proportion of the sampled firms gave positive answers 
to both nominal and real wage rigidity-related questions. We have 146 such firms in our 
dataset (about 1% of the sample). This overlap is either attributable to measurement error or 
caused by the different reference periods in the survey questions regarding the two types of 
12 
 
rigidities.
11 Given that it will be convenient in the subsequent analysis to use multinomial 
logit techniques, we opted to leave these firms out of the sample. 
 
Hence, we have three types of firms in the dataset: (1) firms that have frozen wages are 
considered to be subject to downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR firms); (2) firms that 
apply an automatic wage indexation mechanism are considered to be subject to downward 
real wage rigidity (DRWR firms); (3) firms that don’t show signs of nominal wage rigidity or 
real wage rigidity according to our indicators are considered to be flexible wage firms (FW 
firms). Table 3 presents mean values for a range of variables contained in the survey and used 
later in the regression analysis (more precisely defined in Appendix 6) and tests the 
significance of differences in means for these variables across the three firm types.  
 
The differences in firm characteristics across firms belonging to each of the three groups 
outlined above are quite noticeable. While the share of workers covered by union contracts 
peaks at 80% for firms subject to DRWR, it is only 52% in firms exhibiting flexible wages, 
the differences being statistically significant. Interestingly, the share of union coverage in 
firms subject to DNWR is even lower, at 46%. This large difference in unionisation between 
DRWR firms and FW firms does not seem to be related to a differential incidence of firm-
level bargaining, but rather to the much more important role of outside bargaining in firms 
featuring DRWR, covering 65% of workers vs. 40% of the workers in FW firms. These 
differences are probably very highly correlated to the differences across countries also 
reported in the Table, inasmuch as high-coverage countries such as Belgium and Spain clearly 
present a higher level of DRWR firms.  
 
Some firm characteristics also seem to be related to the incidence of different types of wage 
rigidities. While the share of high-skilled white collars and the share of labour costs in total 
costs appear more important among DNWR firms, the unconditional means suggest a 
negative effect on DRWR. Note, however, that some of these unconditional means might 
change once we control for other factors. Importantly, cross-country differences in the extent 
of the different types of rigidity appear very relevant in our tabulations. Some of these cross-
country differences are likely to reflect institutional features of each country under 
consideration. In addition, they might also be related to the specificities of the samples in each 
country. In the next section we will review how important firm characteristics are, once 
specific country effects have been controlled for.  
                                                 
11 Companies were asked whether they have frozen wages during the last five years and whether they 
are currently indexing wages. Survey questions related to the definitions of nominal wage rigidity and 
real wage rigidity are presented in Appendix 5  
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Table 3: Sample statistics, by type of wage rigidity 
Variable 
Mean 
DNWR 
(9.6% of 
firms) 
Mean 
DRWR 
(16.7% of 
firms) 
Mean 
FW 
(73.7% of 
firms) 
t-stat 
DNWR/
FW 
t-stat 
DRWR/
FW 
Obs 
(total) 
Low-skilled blue-collar (%)  0.355  0.433  0.399  -3.929  4.826  13408 
High-skilled blue-collar (%)  0.276  0.212  0.249  2.918  -6.424  13408 
Low-skilled white-collar (%)  0.137  0.185  0.151  -1.968  8.271  13408 
High-skilled white-collar (%)  0.231  0.170  0.201  3.699  -6.623  13408 
Covered workers (%)  0.457  0.797  0.520  -3.648  25.937  11696 
Only firm-level agreement   0.097  0.096  0.075  2.527  3.835  13426 
Only outside agreement   0.333  0.649  0.392  -3.623  25.857  13426 
Firm-level and outside agreements  0.138  0.148  0.175  -2.959  -3.511  13426 
No union contract  0.432  0.107  0.358  4.580  -27.816  13426 
Permanent workers (%)  0.911  0.908  0.899  1.793  2.213  13449 
Tenure up to 1 year (%)  0.135  0.147  0.155  -2.900  -1.195  7608 
Tenure 1–5 years (%)  0.366  0.353  0.375  -0.976  -2.303  7605 
Tenure over 5 years (%)  0.494  0.497  0.467  2.318  2.595  7605 
Labour cost (%)  0.349  0.330  0.333  2.325  -0.672  12243 
Sector = Manufacturing  0.426  0.414  0.412  0.861  0.224  13551 
Sector = Energy  0.005  0.023  0.010  -1.634  5.291  13551 
Sector = Construction  0.068  0.087  0.068  0.052  3.558  13551 
Sector = Trade  0.184  0.209  0.203  -1.394  0.796  13551 
Sector = Market services  0.274  0.247  0.273  0.095  -2.863  13551 
Sector = Financial interm.  0.015  0.016  0.019  -0.938  -1.156  13551 
Sector = Non-market services  0.027  0.004  0.015  2.940  -5.070  13551 
Country = Austria  0.043  0.019  0.045  -0.218  -6.612  13614 
Country = Belgium  0.001  0.401  0.002  -0.706  77.695  13614 
Country = Czech Rep.  0.094  0.011  0.027  11.382  -5.084  13614 
Country = Estonia  0.067  0.004  0.026  7.219  -7.738  13614 
Country = Spain  0.019  0.299  0.087  -7.563  30.917  13614 
Country = France  0.144  0.045  0.156  -0.974  -16.531  13614 
Country = Greece  0.038  0.021  0.027  2.105  -1.722  13614 
Country = Hungary  0.123  0.070  0.175  -4.185  -14.752  13614 
Country = Ireland  0.072  0.024  0.087  -1.628  -12.248  13614 
Country = Italy  0.036  0.005  0.094  -6.144  -17.298  13614 
Country = Lithuania  0.057  0.008  0.027  5.396  -6.435  13614 
Country = Poland  0.081  0.017  0.080  0.159  -12.645  13614 
Country = Portugal  0.205  0.033  0.115  8.310  -13.848  13614 
Country = Slovenia  0.019  0.043  0.053  -4.721  -2.349  13614 
Size = 5–19  0.210  0.320  0.230  -1.387  10.327  13612 
Size = 20–49  0.217  0.235  0.229  -0.832  0.708  13612 
Size = 50–199  0.365  0.252  0.318  3.058  -7.081  13612 
Size = 200+  0.207  0.193  0.224  -1.198  -3.720  13612 
Price comp = very likely  0.192  0.175  0.174  1.369  0.141  11412 
Price comp = likely  0.459  0.379  0.456  0.167  -6.469  11412 
Price comp = not likely  0.286  0.319  0.306  -1.275  1.124  11412 
Price comp = not at all  0.064  0.127  0.064  -0.072  9.888  11412 
Perceived comp = severe   0.459  0.397  0.402  3.243  -0.306  8803 
Perceived comp = strong   0.438  0.490  0.488  -2.813  0.134  8803 
Perceived comp = weak   0.078  0.088  0.078  0.037  1.027  8803 
Perceived comp = none   0.025  0.025  0.032  -1.141  -1.115  8803 
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 5. Empirical investigation of the factors related to nominal and real wage rigidity 
5.1. Estimation of the multinomial logit model 
 
This section presents the results of the regression analysis on the relationships between real 
and nominal wage rigidity vs various firm-level and institutional characteristics. We start by 
examining firm-level characteristics, and move next to study the impact of labour market 
institutions. As our firms fall into one of three categories – those subject to downward 
nominal wage rigidity, those subject to downward real wage rigidity and those with flexible 
wages – we use multinomial logit estimation methods. All the regression specifications 
presented below include fixed effects based on firm size, country and sector. The inclusion of 
the fixed effects enables us to control in a cross-sectional context for the variation in relevant 
omitted variables that can influence the likelihood of a firm being subject to nominal or real 
wage rigidity. They will account for differences in the survey design across countries, 
differences in the business cycle during the time the interviews took place, etc.
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The multinomial logit model is valid if the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption holds. The IIA assumption means that adding or excluding categories for the 
dependent variable does not affect the odds among the remaining outcomes. We use two tests 
of the IIA assumption, as described by Hausman and McFadden (1984) and Small and Hsiao 
(1985). In the baseline regression, both tests support the IIA assumption. This also holds for 
almost all the other regression specifications. There is no regression specification for which 
this assumption is unambiguously rejected. We conclude on the basis of the IIA tests that 
multinomial logit is a valid estimation method given the structure of the data in the current 
study. Note that two countries covered by the original WDN survey – Germany and the 
Netherlands – are left out of the regression analysis, because their national surveys do not 
include the questions related to wage indexation.  
 
5.2. Estimation results – firm characteristics  
 
We begin by examining the effects of a range of firm characteristics on nominal and real 
wage rigidity. The results of the multinomial logit estimation are shown in Table 4. The first 
                                                 
12 The period covered by the survey relates mainly to the growing phase of the business cycle. 
Therefore, firms’ answers are likely to be biased towards reporting fewer wage freezes and wage cuts 
as compared to the situation of economic downturn, which gives us potentially less variation in the 
data. The extent to which the cyclical position affects the interaction between wage rigidities and such 
factors as firm characteristics, competition and labour market institutions is a-priori unclear and 
represents an interesting field of future research. Examination of firms’ reactions to the current 
economic and financial crisis is the subject of a follow-up survey and is beyond the scope of the present 
study.  
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column in Table 4 reports the odds ratio for downward nominal wage rigidity vs flexible 
wages and the second column the corresponding odds ratio for downward real wage rigidity 
vs flexible wages. Heteroscedasticity-robust p-values are given in the parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Downward nominal and real wage rigidity: Multinomial logit regression 
 
   
Downward nominal wage 
rigidity/ 
Flexible wage 
 
Downward real wage 
rigidity/ 
Flexible wage 
Low-skilled blue-collar (%)  0.553***  1.038 
  (0.000)  (0.809) 
High-skilled blue-collar (%)  0.739*  0.682** 
  (0.063)  (0.026) 
Low-skilled white-collar (%)  0.730  0.684* 
  (0.150)  (0.066) 
Labour cost (%)  1.479**  1.351* 
  (0.033)  (0.063) 
Permanent workers (%)  1.487*  1.187 
  (0.073)  (0.301) 
Size = 20–49  1.149  1.102 
  (0.222)  (0.278) 
Size = 50–199  1.225*  0.995 
  (0.065)  (0.949) 
Size = 200+  1.051  1.060 
  (0.695)  (0.505) 
Sector = Energy  0.676  1.816*** 
  (0.418)  (0.001) 
Sector = Construction  0.765*  1.067 
  (0.076)  (0.649) 
Sector = Trade  0.826*  0.960 
  (0.087)  (0.624) 
Sector = Market services  0.884  0.963 
  (0.209)  (0.619) 
Sector = Financial interm.  0.805  1.395 
  (0.470)  (0.158) 
Sector = Non-market serv.  1.004  0.792 
  (0.987)  (0.521) 
Observations  11981 
Pseudo R2  0.3020 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage and real 
wage rigidity vs flexible wage. The regression includes country fixed effects (not shown). Robust P-
values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
The regression results indicate that workforce composition is related to wage rigidity in a 
manner that is predicted by the theoretical models discussed in Section 3. We find that firms 
employing a larger proportion of high-skilled white-collar workers (the reference category) 
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are more likely to be subject to downward wage rigidity, both in real and nominal terms. The 
shares of high-skilled blue-collar workers and low-skilled white-collar workers are negatively 
related with the likelihood that a firm is subject to downward real wage rigidity. Firms 
employing more blue-collar workers have a lower tendency to be subject to downward 
nominal wage rigidity, this effect being more significant for low-skilled blue-collar workers. 
The odds ratio for the share of labour cost in total cost is significantly larger than those for 
both types of wage rigidity. This shows that production technology influences wage rigidity: 
firms employing labour-intensive technologies are more likely to have rigid wages. For the 
reasons outlined in Section 3, this finding is in accordance with the insider-outsider theory but 
opposes the implications of the reciprocity theory.  
 
The regression results imply that a larger share of permanent workers is associated with 
greater nominal wage rigidity, although this effect is only marginally significant at the 10% 
level. We can expect that permanent workers are subject to more rigid wage setting for 
several reasons. First, their firing costs are in general higher than those of temporary workers, 
and as we will show below, stricter employment protection legislation (EPL) is positively 
related to nominal wage rigidity. Second, collective bargaining contracts are more likely to 
apply to them, which in turn has implications for wage rigidity, as shown later. In addition, 
greater wage flexibility of temporary workers is consistent with some of the efficiency wage 
theories and the insider-outsider model discussed in Section 3. 
  
The regression presented in Table 4 also incorporates controls for the firm size, sector and 
country dummies. Wage rigidity is not significantly related to firm size. The estimated odds 
ratios for the sector dummies indicate that firms in the construction and trade sectors are less 
likely to be subject to nominal wage rigidity, whereas the propensity of being subject to real 
wage rigidity is higher in the energy sector. However, most of the sectoral fixed effects are 
insignificant, whereas country effects appear significant and quite sizeable for almost all 
countries.
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Table 5 presents the estimated odds ratios for two additional regression specifications.
14 The 
first specification includes two dummy variables related with worker tenure in a firm.
15 We 
included the two tenure categories measuring the shares of workers who have 1–5 years of 
tenure and above 5 years of tenure. The excluded category was the share of workers with less 
                                                 
13 The estimated odds ratios for the country fixed effects are available from the authors upon request.  
14 The variables included in the additional regression specifications were not included in the baseline 
regression because their inclusion reduces the sample size, and this reduction possibly occurs in a non-
random manner.  
15 This variable is not available for France, Italy and Spain.  
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than one year of tenure. The estimated odds ratios imply that the larger is the average tenure 
in a firm, the more likely it is that this firm is subject to nominal wage rigidity. This result is 
also in accordance with the implications of the theoretical models on wage rigidity that were 
reviewed in section 3.
16  
 
 
Table 5: Downward nominal and real wage rigidity – additional firm characteristics 
 
   
Tenure structure 
 
Bonus payment 
   
DNWR/FW 
 
DRWR/FW 
 
DNWR/FW 
 
DRWR/FW 
Tenure 1–5 years (%)  2.593***  0.822     
  (0.003)  (0.508)     
Tenure above 5 years (%)  2.719***  1.032     
  (0.000)  (0.899)     
Bonus      1.015  1.098 
      (0.883)  (0.196) 
Observations  6449  10298 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage and real 
wage rigidity vs flexible wage. Worker skill groups, % permanent workers, % labour cost, dummy 
variables for different types of union contracts and sector, size and country fixed effects are added in all 
specifications. Robust P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
Table 5 also presents the estimated odds ratio for the dummy variable indicating the payment 
of performance-related bonuses in addition to the base wage. The estimated odds ratios for 
nominal and real wage rigidity vs flexible wage category were both insignificantly different 
from one. This result prevailed when we used the share of bonuses in total pay instead of the 
above-described dummy variable. This is a surprising finding at least when it comes to 
DNWR, where we would expect firms having more flexible wage components to be able to 
afford higher rigidity in base wages at a little cost. It is at odds with evidence for 4 European 
countries reported by Messina et al. (2009), who find lower wage rigidity in those sectors 
with a higher share of bonuses and other flexible wage components in total compensation. 
One possible explanation is that some of our survey respondents confused base wages with 
total wages at the time of assessing wage freezes and wage cuts, hence answering for the total 
degree of wage rigidity among the main occupation group employed by the firm. 
 
 
                                                 
16 The complete regression results for the regressions investigating the effects of tenure, bonuses and 
competition are presented in Appendix 8. 
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5.3. Estimation results – competition  
 
In addition to the above-described firm characteristics, we also explored the effect of the 
extent of competition in the product market environment in which the firm operates. The 
effects of competition on wage rigidities are ambiguous. Firms subject to stronger competitive 
pressure may need more flexible wage-setting practices, which would imply a negative 
relationship between competition and wage rigidity. On the other hand, in sectors with severe 
competition rents should be low, and therefore so should wages. In such sectors, unions try to 
set common wage standards to avoid severe product market competition causing a race to the 
bottom of wages. As Cardoso and Portugal (2005) argue, in the absence of the wage cushion 
typical of non-competitive environments, wages are more likely to be rigid, since the leeway 
firms have for cutting wages in face of a negative shock is reduced. This would imply a 
positive association between competition and wage rigidity. 
 
 
Table 6: Downward nominal and real wage rigidity – competition 
 
   
Perceived competition 
 
Price competition 
   
DNWR/FW 
 
DRWR/FW 
 
DNWR/FW 
 
DRWR/FW 
Perceived comp = strong   0.674***  1.128     
  (0.000)  (0.161)     
Perceived comp = weak   0.770*  1.255     
  (0.079)  (0.128)     
Perceived comp = none  0.696  0.662     
  (0.154)  (0.150)     
Price comp = likely      0.920  0.887 
      (0.423)  (0.161) 
Price comp = not likely      0.881  0.851* 
      (0.261)  (0.089) 
Price comp = not at all      1.019  1.039 
      (0.915)  (0.782) 
Observations  7549  9969 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage and real 
wage rigidity vs flexible wage. Worker skill groups, % permanent workers, % labour cost, dummy 
variables for different types of union contracts and sector, size and country fixed effects are added in all 
specifications. Robust P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
The survey included two questions on the firms’ competitive environment. The price 
competition variable relates to a question on the likelihood of the firm changing its price in 
response to a price change by its main competitor; the answers were given on a four-point 
scale, from very likely to not at all. A second question on perceived competition was also 
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included; the firm was asked to directly rate the intensity of competition it faced in its main 
market. The answer was again requested on a four-point scale, ranging from severe 
competition to no competition.
17  
 
The related regression results are presented in Table 6. The estimations yield different results, 
depending on which competition measure we use. Two out of three of the estimated odds 
ratios for the dummy variables measuring different levels of perceived competition are 
significantly lower than one in the case of nominal wage rigidity. This implies that firms who 
face severe competition (the excluded category) are more likely to be subject to rigidity in 
nominal terms than firms facing lower competition levels. Thus, there seems to be a positive 
(although not monotonous) relationship between product market competition and nominal 
wage rigidity. However, this empirical finding depends on the way competition is measured – 
a similar significant relationship is not present if we use the price-reduction-based 
competition measure instead of perceived competition.
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If more competition is associated with higher wage rigidity due to the absence of a wage 
cushion to lower wages during a downturn, we should find stronger effects for competition in 
countries where it is more likely that severe competition is associated with lower wage levels, 
and where competition forces a larger proportion of workers to earn wages that are close to 
the statutory minimum level. This is more likely to be the case in the non-euro area countries 
included in our sample, since these countries tend to specialise in labour-intensive 
technologies and have a higher tendency to be involved in industries where competition is 
price-driven as opposed to quality-driven. We test this possibility by running separate 
regressions for the euro area and non-euro area countries. The regression results are presented 
in Table 7. The estimated odds ratios indicate that competition indeed has a much stronger 
(and monotonous) positive relationship with nominal wage rigidity in non-euro area countries, 
although similarly to the pooled regression results this significant relationship is present only 
for the measure that is based on perceived competition. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Note that the use of the second measure (perceived competition) results in a significant reduction of 
the sample size, since the related question was not included in the national surveys of Austria, Belgium, 
Spain and Italy.  
18 Note that the significance of the estimated effects can also depend on the sample coverage, since the 
measure of perceived competition is available for only 10 countries out of 14. We tested for this 
possibility by estimating the regression including the price-reduction-based competition measure for 
the same set of 10 countries (i.e. excluding Austria, Belgium, Spain and Italy). The estimated effect 
was still insignificant, which implies that the results depend on the way competition is measured and 
not on different sample coverage.  
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Table 7: The effect of competition on wage rigidity: Euro area vs non-euro area  
 
 
   Euro area  Non-euro area  Euro area  Non-euro area 
  
DNWR/ 
FW 
DRWR/ 
FW 
DNWR/ 
FW 
DRWR/ 
FW 
DNWR/ 
FW 
DRWR/ 
FW 
DNWR/ 
FW 
DRWR/ 
FW 
Perceived comp = 
strong   0.763** 1.033  0.581*** 1.290*            
   (0.018)  (0.762)  (0.000)  (0.080)            
Perceived comp = 
weak   0.926  1.158  0.616**  1.388             
   (0.715)  (0.463)  (0.023)  (0.156)            
Perceived comp = 
none  1.155  0.780  0.260**  0.627             
   (0.636)  (0.514)  (0.014)  (0.277)            
Price comp = 
likely              0.956  0.889  0.867  0.915 
               (0.744)  (0.225)  (0.372)  (0.657) 
Price comp =  
not likely              0.825  0.803**  0.951  1.059 
               (0.203)  (0.041)  (0.770)  (0.784) 
Price comp =  
not at all              1.172  1.032  0.791  1.087 
               (0.465)  (0.840)  (0.449)  (0.796) 
 
Observations  4319  3230  6982  2987 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage and real 
wage rigidity vs flexible wage. Worker skill groups, % permanent workers, % labour cost, dummy 
variables for different types of union contracts and sector, size and country fixed effects are added in all 
specifications. Robust P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The full regression 
estimations are presented in Appendix 9. 
 
 
5.4. Estimation results – labour market institutions 
 
In the above-described regressions, almost all the dummy variables for countries have highly 
significant estimates for the odds ratios of both types of rigidity vs flexible wage setting. As 
country effects appear to have an important impact on wage rigidity, national labour market 
institutions are a natural suspect as the cause of the differences between countries. Previous 
research in this area has demonstrated that indicators of the institutional environment, such as 
collective bargaining coverage and employment protection, are significantly correlated with 
real wage rigidity and nominal wage rigidity. We extend this analysis to more countries, 
exploiting the substantial cross-country variation in the institutionalisation of the wage-setting 
process between the euro area and non-euro area economies. In all our specifications we look 
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at firm rather than country or sectoral-level indicators of institutions, in an attempt to obtain 
more robust estimates of the institutional determinants of rigidity. Hence, all the regression 
specifications analysing institutional effects include country fixed effects, which control for 
unobservable country characteristics. 
 
First, we analyse the effect of collective bargaining coverage. The WDN survey contains 
firm-level information on the share of employees covered by collective bargaining. The 
regression estimates for this variable are presented in Table 8. The estimations indicate that 
bargaining coverage is positively associated with real wage rigidity and insignificantly related 
with nominal wage rigidity. This finding is in accordance with the results of earlier empirical 
studies, which were based on country-level measures of rigidity (Holden and Wulfsberg, 
2007; Dickens et al., 2007).  
 
Table 8: Downward nominal and real wage rigidity – collective bargaining coverage 
 
   
Collective bargaining coverage 
   
DNWR/FW 
 
DRWR/FW 
Covered workers (%)  1.010  1.273** 
  (0.922)  (0.030) 
Observations  10309 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage and real 
wage rigidity vs flexible wage. Worker skill groups, % permanent workers, % labour cost, and sector, 
size and country fixed effects are added in both specifications. Robust P-values in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The full regression estimation is presented in Appendix 10.  
 
 
In addition to bargaining coverage, we explore the effect of employment protection legislation 
on wage rigidity. For this purpose, we employ the EPL index, which measures the overall 
strictness of individual dismissals (OECD, 2004; Tonin, 2005). The values of the EPL index 
across the sampled countries are presented in Table 2. We cannot enter the EPL indices 
directly in the regressions since these country-level variables are linear combinations of the 
set of country dummies. Instead, we interact the EPL index with the share of permanent 
workers in the firm. Note that while the share of permanent employees in every country is 
likely to be determined by the strictness of EPL, this effect should be captured by the country 
dummies included in the regression. Similarly, differences in technology across sectors would 
require different turnover rates, and hence an optimal mix of fixed and short-term contracts. 
Our sectoral dummies should, to some extent, capture these differences. Thus, our regression 
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exercise captures the effect of EPL on wage rigidities based on deviations in the mix of 
temporary versus permanent contracts from country and sectoral averages. 
  
Table 9 presents the regression results for different values of the share of permanent workers 
and the EPL index. Note that since the interactive term is nonlinear, the estimated effects on 
the odds ratios are dependent on the values of the interacted variables. Appendix 4 presents 
the derivation of the formulas for computing the interaction effects in multinomial logit 
models following Rõõm (2009). The estimated odds ratios of DNWR and DRWR vs flexible 
wage can be calculated on the basis of formula (10) in Appendix 4, and the significance levels 
for the estimated effects are computed using the delta method. The estimated odds ratio for 
nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage is significantly larger than one for approximately 81% 
of the observations. The value of the odds ratio is positively related with the values of both 
interacted variables. The odds ratio for real wage rigidity is insignificantly different from one.  
 
Table 9: Downward nominal and real wage rigidity – interaction of the EPL index with 
the share of permanent workers 
 
Percentile (share of 
permanent workers, 
EPL index) 
Value  Value  Odds ratio  Odds ratio 
Share of 
permanent 
workers  EPL index  DNWR  /  FW  DRWR  /  FW 
10th, 10th  0.692  1.726  2.158***  1.101 
         (0.038)  (0.707) 
10th, 50th  0.692  2.413  3.488*  1.069 
         (0.056)  (0.868) 
50th, 10th  1.000  1.726  2.683**  1.087 
         (0.04)  (0.795) 
50th, 50th  1.000  2.413  4.362*  1.054 
         (0.077)  (0.911) 
90th, 90th  1.000  4.167  15.095  0.977 
         (0.259)  (0.979) 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentile values of the two interacted 
variables. Probability values are presented in parentheses below the estimated effects, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The estimations are based on a multinomial logit regression that includes as control variables worker skill 
groups, % permanent workers, % labour cost, dummy variables for different types of union contracts and sector, 
size and country fixed effects. The full regression estimation is presented in Appendix 10. 
 
 
The regression results indicate that strictness of labour regulations interacted with the share of 
permanent employees is positively related with the likelihood that a firm is subject to nominal 
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wage rigidity. The estimates also imply that the larger is the share of permanent workers 
and/or the larger is the EPL index, the stronger is this effect. These results are in line with our 
expectations, since the existence of permanent contracts complemented with strict labour 
regulations gives workers more leeway in wage negotiations, which in turn should lead to 
greater wage rigidity. In particular, it is harder for firms to cut workers’ wages if the threat of 
lay-off is more difficult to implement. Thus, permanent contracts impose greater wage rigidity 
than temporary contracts as long as permanent workers are more protected by labour 
regulations. As a consequence, the effect of permanent contracts on wage rigidity should be 
more significant in countries with stricter employment protection.  
 
The WDN survey contains information on the structure of agreements applicable for a given 
firm. Managers were asked if a collective wage agreement exists and if so, whether it is a 
firm-level agreement or a binding agreement that was negotiated at a level outside the firm 
(e.g. national, sector level, etc). We use this information to analyse the implications that the 
union contracts negotiated at different levels have on wage rigidity. For this purpose, we 
construct three non-nested dummy variables that characterise the type of union contract(s) 
applying to the firm; the first indicating the existence of only a firm-level agreement, the 
second signifying only an outside agreement, and the third being equal to one if a firm has 
both firm-level and outside agreements.  
 
Appendix 7 gives an overview of the cross-country differences in the incidence of union 
contracts negotiated at different levels. This comparison reveals striking contrasts in the 
tendency of different types of union contracts across the sampled countries. In particular, 
there is a group of countries (Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and Slovenia) where 
almost all firms have union contracts and also display a very high incidence of higher-level 
bargaining agreements. On the other hand most of the sampled non-euro area countries 
(Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland) have very few firms with higher-level agreements.  
 
We can expect that the effects of union contracts negotiated at different levels will be 
heterogeneous across countries, since different aspects of wage setting that matter for wage 
rigidity can be applied at the higher level (sectoral or national) in some countries and at the 
firm level in others. This is especially relevant regarding wage indexation, which we use as an 
indicator of real wage rigidity. Similarly, the impact of firm-level contracts is likely to differ 
across countries depending on the most prevalent wage-setting norm in the economy: a firm-
level contract may buy some additional flexibility in countries where the most common 
negotiation is outside the firm, while it might impose additional rigidity in a country where 
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most negotiations are carried out at individual level. Therefore we analyse the union effects 
separately for each country.
19  
 
The regression results are presented in Table 10 on a country-by-country basis. Given that 
higher-level contracts are almost uniformly applicable in one subgroup of sampled countries 
and practically non-existent in another subgroup, we can only selectively enter the above-
described union dummies in the country-level regressions. Several of the estimated odds 
ratios for the union dummies are insignificantly different from one. Significant results are 
more common within the subset of countries that have higher within-country variation in 
employment relations, and for which it was possible to include the three different dummies 
simultaneously in the regressions. These results reveal that the effects of different types of 
wage negotiation are indeed heterogeneous. The estimations imply that higher-level contracts 
are more likely to impose real wage rigidity in Poland for example, whereas firm-level 
contracts are positively associated with real wage rigidity in Ireland and Portugal. In addition, 
we find that higher-level agreements are associated with more nominal wage rigidity in Spain 
for example, whereas firm-level agreements are positively related to nominal wage rigidity in 
Portugal.   
 
Next, we group the countries on the basis of firms covered by outside agreements.
20 The 
group of countries with high coverage by outside agreements includes Austria, Belgium, 
Spain, France, Italy and Slovenia; the group with medium coverage consists of Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal; and the low-coverage group includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Lithuania and Poland.
21 Due to the above-described heterogeneity of the cross-
country results, it cannot be assumed that the estimated effects apply uniformly to all 
countries within the subgroups. Rather, we can interpret them as illustrating the effects that 
apply to the majority of enterprises within each subgroup.  
 
 
                                                 
19 We were not able to estimate the multinomial logit regression for Belgium due to the very low 
number of firms subject to DNWR according to our definition. Therefore, Belgium is excluded from 
the following analysis. Note that almost all Belgian firms apply wage indexation and this is imposed by 
contracts negotiated at the outside (i.e. sectoral) level.  
20 See Table 2 for an overview of the incidence of higher-level union agreements. 
21 Greece is a country with a high coverage by outside agreements and thus could be included in the 
first group of countries. However, it has a relatively higher within-country variation of union contract 
types; we therefore include Greece in the medium-coverage group in order to exploit this variation for 
the purposes of our regression analysis. 
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Table 10. Wage rigidity vs different types of union contracts. Separate regressions for each country.  
 
  
Austria  Spain  France  Italy  Slovenia 
DNWR  DRWR DNWR DRWR DNWR  DRWR DNWR DRWR  DNWR  DRWR 
Only outside agreement  0.528 0.470**  1.359** 0.794  1.142  0.847  0.882  0.822  0.446  0.850 
   (0.168)  (0.049) (0.036)  (0.704) (0.526)  (0.402) (0.741) (0.740)  (0.140)  (0.521) 
Observations  392  392  1815  1815  1533  1533  782  782  639  639 
  
Estonia  Hungary  Lithuania  Poland 
DNWR  DRWR DNWR  DRWR DNWR  DRWR  DNWR  DRWR 
Only outside agreement                    1.174  4.811* 
                     (0.884)  (0.063) 
Only  firm-level  agreement  1.008  1.652  0.949  1.478  0.509  2.048  1.056  1.193 
   (0.991) (0.739) (0.888)  (0.192) (0.164) (0.126)  (0.880)  (0.636) 
Observations  307  307  1496  1496  321  321  784  784 
  
Greece  Czech Republic  Ireland  Portugal 
DNWR  DRWR DNWR DRWR  DNWR  DRWR  DNWR  DRWR 
Only outside agreement  0.727  0.866  5.848**  6.774** 0.866  1.272  1.234  1.319 
   (0.456) (0.696) (0.026) (0.049)  (0.670) (0.535)  (0.253)  (0.302) 
Only  firm-level  agreement  0.672  0.285  1.004  1.567  1.371  3.250*  2.275*  5.324*** 
   (0.658) (0.266) (0.988) (0.357)  (0.637) (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.001) 
Both agreements        0.718 2.893* 0.469 3.615***  0.610  0.918 
         (0.478) (0.071)  (0.151) (0.002)  (0.208)  (0.872) 
Observations  315  315  364  364  752  752  1188  1188 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage (DNWR) and real wage rigidity vs flexible wage (DRWR). Worker 
skill groups, % permanent workers, % labour cost, and sector, size and country fixed effects are added in all specifications. P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reference group includes the firms having both types of contracts for Austria, France and Italy; the firms having only firm-level contracts for 
Spain and Slovenia; and the firms with no union contracts for the rest of the countries. 
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The regression results are presented in Table 11. The reference group is different for the first 
group (countries with a high incidence of outside agreements). For this subset, the excluded 
category consists (almost exclusively) of firms with firm-level agreements, which are 
implemented either simultaneously with outside agreements (Austria, France and Italy) or not 
(Spain and Slovenia).
22 For the other two groups of countries, the reference group includes 
firms with no union contracts.  
 
Table 11. Wage rigidity vs different types of union contracts – regressions for groups of 
countries with high, medium and low incidence of outside agreements 
 
   
High incidence 
 
Medium incidence 
 
Low incidence 
  DNWR/ 
FW 
DRWR/ 
FW 
DNWR/ 
FW 
DRWR/ 
FW 
DNWR
/FW 
DRWR/ 
FW 
Only  outside  agreement  0.915  0.794**  1.087  1.345  1.485  2.558* 
  (0.587)  (0.019)  (0.594)  (0.142)  (0.374)  (0.091) 
Only firm-level 
agreement 
    1.680  2.631**  0.884  1.386* 
      (0.108)  (0.013)  (0.467)  (0.086) 
Both agreements      0.565** 1.956*** 0.686  1.500 
      (0.041)  (0.009)  (0.303)  (0.329) 
Observations  5161  2256  3272 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage and real 
wage rigidity vs flexible wage. Worker skill groups, % permanent workers, % labour cost, and sector, 
size and country fixed effects are added in all specifications. P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first group (countries with a high incidence of outside agreements) includes 
Austria, France, Italy, Spain and Slovenia. The second group (medium incidence) includes Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal. The third group (low incidence) includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania and Poland. The full regression estimations are presented in Appendix 10. 
 
 
The regression results indicate that in countries with high or medium-level coverage by 
outside agreements, firm-level contracts are more likely to impose real wage rigidity than 
higher-level contracts. In countries with low coverage by outside agreements, either outside or 
firm-level contracts can increase real wage rigidity with respect to the reference category (the 
absence of unions in wage negotiations). On the basis of the country-level regressions for 
some countries, e.g. Poland, it seems that outside contracts are more restrictive for wages than 
firm-level contracts. For other countries with low coverage by outside agreements there is not 
sufficient data to analyse that (since very few firms have higher-level union contracts). 
  
Overall, we find clear indications suggesting that the participation of unions in the wage-
setting process is associated with a higher extent of DRWR. In countries with a higher level 
                                                 
22 Only 18 firms (0.3% of the sample) do not have collective wage agreements in these countries.  
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of union coverage and more centralised wage setting, firm-level negotiations tend to have a 
stronger impact on real wage rigidity, but this result is not uniform across countries.  
  
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the flexibility of wages across European firms. We look at the extent of 
rigidities in base wages by estimating the frequency of wage freezes (downward nominal 
wage rigidity) and the incidence of wage indexation (downward real wage rigidity). We 
address these issues using a unique survey with a large sample of firms and data from 
fourteen countries. A substantial proportion of firms who participated in the survey report that 
they have frozen wages or that there exists an automatic link between wages and inflation. 
Instead, less than 1% of the more than 47 million workers that the survey represents have 
experienced a wage cut during the five-year period prior to the survey. This leads us to the 
conclusion that wage rigidities, both nominal and real, are quite prevalent in Europe.  
 
We use multinomial logit regressions to analyse what factors are related to wage rigidity. Our 
estimations indicate that country effects appear to be significant determinants of downward 
wage rigidities and that institutional differences between countries are an important factor 
behind this finding. The regression results imply that high collective bargaining coverage 
increases real wage rigidity. Analysis of the union contracts negotiated at different levels 
(firm-level vs higher-level bargaining contracts) implies that firm-level contracts are a more 
likely source of real wage rigidity in centralised wage-setting environments. However, there is 
substantial heterogeneity across countries regarding the impact of different types of union 
contracts. For example, for Belgium we know a priori that 98% of firms are subject to real 
wage rigidity by our definition (i.e. imply wage indexation) and that this is implemented by 
sector-level bargaining agreements. For some non-euro area countries (e.g. Poland) outside 
contracts appear to be more restrictive for wages than firm-level contracts. Another 
institutional aspect that influences wage rigidity is related to how difficult it is for employers 
to lay off workers. We find that nominal wage rigidity is positively associated with the extent 
of permanent contracts. In addition, permanent contracts have a stronger effect on wage 
rigidity in countries with stricter labour regulations. 
 
Workforce composition also appears to play a significant role in the determination of wage 
rigidities. Both types of wage rigidity are positively related with the share of high-skilled 
white collars; downward nominal wage rigidity is positively related with employees’ tenure in 
the firms under study. Both of these significant relationships are consistent with the 
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implications of related theoretical models. In addition, we find that firms employing labour-
intensive technologies are more likely to have rigid wages.  
 
Finally, there seems to be a positive (although non-monotonous) relationship between product 
market competition and downward nominal wage rigidity. A possible cause of this empirical 
result is that in highly competitive industries rents should be low, and therefore so should 
wages. This leaves smaller margins to reduce wages, because firms paying low wages that are 
closer to a collectively agreed or legislative minimum level have less flexibility than firms 
having a so-called wage cushion between the minimum and the actual wage level. We find 
that the positive relationship between competition and wage rigidity is more significant in 
non-euro area countries, which lends further support to the above-described cause of this 
finding, since it is more likely that in these countries severe competition is associated with 
low wage levels. However, this positive significant relationship is not present in all the 
regression specifications, indicating that the results are dependent on the way competition is 
measured.  
 
Our findings of the patterns and determinants of wage rigidities in 15 European Union 
countries contribute to the discussion of the role of monetary policy and its effects. The 
analysis of the monetary policy implications of wage rigidities was motivated by the 
conclusions of the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network (IPN). One of the key results 
reported by the IPN was that there is a substantial degree of persistence in inflation, which 
needs to be taken into account when implementing common monetary policy. It was further 
suggested that in the current monetary policy regime inflation persistence may originate from 
wage rigidities.
23 Similarly to the IPN’s finding of heterogeneity in inflation persistence 
across European countries, our results indicate the presence of country-specific patterns of 
downward nominal and real wage rigidities. To the extent that rigidities and their variation 
across regions of a monetary union complicate the design of optimal monetary policy 
(Carlsson and Westermark, 2008; Fahr and Smets, 2008), policies that facilitate adjustment in 
the monetary union in the presence of imbalances may need to be considered.  
 
  
 
  
 
 
                                                 
23 See Altissimo, Ehrmann and Smets (2006) for a summary of the IPN’s findings.  
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Appendix 1: Main characteristics of the national surveys 
 
Country   Sectors covered  Firms’ 
size  Sample 
Number of 
responding 
firms 
(response 
rate)  
How the 
survey was 
carried out  
Austria 
Manufacturing, 
Energy, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services, 
Financial 
intermediation  
5  3,500  557  (16%) 
External 
company: 
traditional 
mail 
Belgium 
Manufacturing, 
Energy, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services, 
Financial 
intermediation  
5  4,100  1,431  (35%) 
NBB: 
traditional 
mail 
Czech 
Republic 
Manufacturing, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services 
20  1,591  399  (25%) 
CNB 
branches: 
internet 
Estonia 
Manufacturing, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services 
5  1,400  366  (26%) 
External 
company: 
internet 
France 
Manufacturing, 
Trade, Market 
services, Non-
market services 
5  6,500  2,029  (31%) 
Local 
branches: 
phone, mail 
and face to 
face 
Germany 
Manufacturing, 
Market services, 
Non-market services 
All  4,600  1,832  (40%) 
IFO: 
traditional 
mail 
Greece 
Manufacturing, 
Trade, Market 
services, Non-
market services 
All  5,000  429  (9%) 
External 
company: 
traditional 
mail 
Hungary 
Manufacturing, 
Energy, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services, 
Financial 
intermediation  
5  3,785  2,006  (53%) 
External 
company: 
face-to-face 
interviews 
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Country   Sectors covered  Firms’ 
size  Sample 
Number of 
responding 
firms 
(response 
rate) 
How the 
survey was 
carried out  
Ireland 
Manufacturing, 
Energy, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services, 
Financial 
intermediation, Non-
market services  
5  4,000  985  (25%) 
External 
company: 
traditional 
mail, phone  
Italy 
Manufacturing, 
Trade, Market 
services, Financial 
intermediation 
5  4,000  953  (24%) 
External 
company: 
internet 
Lithuania 
Manufacturing, 
Energy, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services, 
Financial 
intermediation,  
All  2,810  343  (12%) 
External 
company: 
phone, mail 
and face to 
face 
Netherlands 
Manufacturing, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services, 
Financial 
intermediation,  
5  2,116  1,068  (50%) 
External 
company: 
internet 
Poland 
Manufacturing, 
Energy, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services, 
Financial 
intermediation 
All  1,600  1,161  (73%) 
National 
Bank of 
Poland 
branches: 
traditional 
mail 
Portugal 
Manufacturing, 
Energy, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services, 
Financial 
intermediation, Non-
market services  
5  5,000  1,436  (29%) 
Banco de 
Portugal: 
traditional 
mail, 
internet 
Slovenia 
Manufacturing, 
Energy, 
Construction, Trade, 
Market services, 
Financial 
intermediation 
5  3,000  666  (22%) 
Banka 
Slovenije: 
traditional 
mail and 
internet 
Spain 
Manufacturing, 
Energy, Trade, 
Market services 
All  3000  1,835  (61%) 
External 
company: 
mail, phone, 
fax, internet 
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Appendix 2: Sample characteristics 
 
Table A1: Country composition of the sample  
Country  Number of observations  Per cent of total 
Austria  557  3.89 
Belgium   1,431  10 
Czech Republic   399  2.79 
Estonia   366  2.56 
Spain  1,834  12.82 
France   2,029  14.18 
Greece   402  2.81 
Hungary   2,006  14.02 
Ireland   985  6.88 
Italy   953  6.66 
Lithuania   337  2.36 
Poland   908  6.35 
Portugal   1,436  10.04 
Slovenia   666  4.65 
Euro area  10,293  71.93 
Non euro area   4,016  28.07 
Total  14,309  100 
 
 
Table A2: Sectoral composition of the sample 
Sector  Number of firms   Per cent of total 
Manufacturing  5,960  41.84 
Energy  178  1.25 
Construction  1,018  7.15 
Trade  2,834  19.89 
Market services  3,805  26.71 
Financial intermediation  258  1.81 
Non-market services  192  1.35 
Total  14,245  100 
 
 
Table A3: Size composition of the sample 
Size  Number of firms   Per cent of total 
5–19  3,556  24.86 
20–49  3,271  22.86 
50–199  4,390  30.69 
200+  3,089  21.59 
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Appendix 3: Employment-adjusted sampling weight 
 
Formally, the employment-adjusted sampling weight is the product of three individual 
weights:  
3 2 1 w w w wl    
1 w : adjusts for the unequal probability of firms being included in the intended sample, i.e. the 
probability of receiving a questionnaire  
¸
¹
·
¨
©
§   * 1
h
h
n
N w  
h N  : population of firms within each stratum 
*
h n  : intended gross sample of firms within each stratum  
 
2 w : adjusts for non response 
¸
¹
·
¨
©
§  
h
h
n
n w
*
2  
h n : realised sample of firms within each stratum, i.e. the actual number of firms that receive 
and reply to the questionnaire 
The product of  1 w   and  2 w , which differ by construction across strata, is equal 
to ¸
¹
· ¨
©
§  
h
h
n
N w w 2 1  and corrects for the unequal probability of firms being included in the 
realised sample. 
 
3 w : adjusts for differences in the average firm size (in the population) across different strata  
¸
¹
· ¨
©
§  
h
h
N
L w3  
h L : is population employment in each stratum 
 
By combining the expressions for 1 w ,  2 w and 3 w , we obtain the following expression for the 
employment-adjusted weight: ¸
¹
· ¨
©
§  
h
h
l n
L w . Therefore, the employment-adjusted weight is 
equal to the population employment in each stratum divided by the number of firms, in each 
stratum, in the realised sample. 
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Appendix 4: Derivation of the odds ratios for interactive variables in the multinomial 
logit model  
 
 
1. General case 
 
Let us assume that the multinomial logit model is estimated for a categorical variable that has 
N outcomes. Let’s call the estimated sets of coefficients for the different values of the 
dependent variable:  
 
, ,
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Then the corresponding probabilities for each outcome are:  
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where y is the dependent variable and X is the vector of control variables. The estimation of 
this set of equations yields multiple solutions. Therefore, the outcomes are normalised by 
equalising the coefficients for the base outcome to zero. Let’s assume (without loss of 
generality) that y = 1 is the base outcome:  
 
0
) 1 (   E  
 
Then equations (1) to (N) become: 
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The relative probability (or the odds) for y = m to the base outcome is 
 
 
) (
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) Pr( m X e
y
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             (7) 
 
 
Generally, if xi changes by one unit, then the odds ratio for y = m to the base outcome will be: 
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This can be interpreted as follows: For a unit change in xi the odds of y = m versus y = 1 are 
expected to change by a factor of 
) (m
i e
E
, ceteris paribus.  
 
 
2. Model includes an interactive term (two continuous variables) 
 
Let us assume that the regression equation includes an interactive variable xi xj. Let’s assume 
further that xi and x j are continuous variables. In this case the ceteris paribus assumption 
cannot be invoked, since if xi changes by one unit, then xi xj will also change. Therefore, if xi 
changes by one unit then the corresponding change in the odds is:  
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This odds ratio is conditional on the value of xj. 
 
Let us assume that xi changes by one unit and xj changes by one unit. Then the corresponding 
change in the odds of y = m to the base outcome is:  
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3. Model includes an interactive term (a continuous variable and a dummy variable) 
 
 
Let us assume that the regression equation includes an interactive variable xi xj. Let us further 
assume that xi is a dummy variable and xj is a continuous variable. If xi changes from zero to 
one then the corresponding change in the odds is:  
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The change in the odds ratio is analogous to (9). 
 
If xj changes by one unit then the odds ratio is:  
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Let’s assume that xi changes from zero to one and xj changes by one unit. The total effect of 
these changes is:  
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4. Model includes an interactive term (two dummy variables) 
 
Let us assume that the regression equation includes an interactive variable xi xj. Let us further 
assume xi and xj are dummy variables. The effect of only one variable from the interactive 
term changing from 0 to 1 is analogous to (12). 
 
The total effect of both variables changing from zero to one is as follows: 
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 Appendix 5: Questions used for the creation of the dependent variables 
Question 6 – Does your firm have a policy that adapts changes in base wages to inflation? 
Definition of base wage – direct remuneration excluding bonuses (regular wage and salary, commissions, piecework 
payments).  
No   Ƒ 
Yes  Ƒ 
   
Question 7 – If “yes” in question 6, please select the option that best reflects the policy followed: 
Wage changes are automatically linked to:   
                             - past inflation   Ƒ 
                             - expected inflation   Ƒ 
Although there is no formal rule, wage changes take into account:   
                             - past inflation  Ƒ 
                             - expected inflation   Ƒ 
   
Question 14 – Over the last five years, has the base wage of some employees in your firm ever been frozen?  
Definition of freeze in base wage – base wage in nominal terms remains unchanged from a pay negotiation to the next.  
    - No   Ƒ 
    - Yes (indicate for what percentage of your employees)  _____% 
   
41 
 
 
Appendix 6: Variable definitions 
 
Dependent variable: A categorical variable that takes three values (0 = flexible wage; 1 = 
nominal wage rigidity; 2 = real wage rigidity) 
Low-skilled blue-collar (%): Proportion of workers belonging to this category (as a share of 
total employment)  
Low-skilled white-collar (%): Ditto 
High-skilled blue-collar (%): Ditto 
High-skilled white-collar (%): Ditto 
Covered workers (%): Proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining contract(s) 
Permanent workers (%): Proportion of permanent employees 
Only outside agreement: Firm applies only an agreement concluded outside the firm 
Only firm-level agreement: Firm applies only an agreement concluded within the firm 
Both agreements: Firm applies both firm-level and outside agreements 
Labour cost (%): The share of labour cost in total cost 
Price comp – likely etc: Implied competition capturing whether firms are likely or not to 
follow competitors’ price changes (ranges from very likely to not at all, 4 categories)  
Perceived comp – severe etc: Self-defined competition capturing firms’ perception regarding 
the intensity of product market competition (ranges from severe to none, 4 categories) 
EPL: An index measuring the strictness of employment protection legislation, which ranges 
from 0 (weak) to 4 (strong) 
Permanent workers (%) * EPL: Interaction of the variable capturing the strictness of 
employment protection legislation with the proportion of permanent employees 
Tenure up to 1 year (%): Proportion of permanent employees with tenure less than a year 
Tenure 1–5 yrs (%): Proportion of permanent employees with tenure between 1 and 5 years 
Tenure over 5 years (%): Proportion of permanent employees with tenure above 5 years  
Bonus: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if firm pays bonuses and zero otherwise 
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Appendix 7. Cross-country variation in the incidence of different types of union 
contracts 
 
 
  
Only firm-
level 
agreement 
Only outside 
agreement 
Both 
agreements 
No collective 
agreement 
Austria  0.006  0.765  0.211  0.018 
Belgium  0.006  0.727  0.256  0.011 
Czech Republic  0.356  0.025  0.150  0.468 
Estonia  0.068  0.019  0.011  0.902 
Spain  0.176  0.824  0.000  0.000 
France  0.001  0.430  0.568  0.001 
Greece  0.057  0.679  0.179  0.085 
Hungary  0.098  0.000  0.000  0.902 
Ireland  0.034  0.435  0.209  0.322 
Italy  0.001  0.583  0.409  0.006 
Lithuania  0.199  0.009  0.006  0.786 
Poland  0.149  0.014  0.022  0.814 
Portugal  0.029  0.524  0.070  0.377 
Slovenia  0.202  0.798  0.000  0.000 
Total  0.080  0.449  0.172  0.299 
 
Notes: The share of firms applying a given contract type. Non-weighted averages.
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Appendix 8: Wage rigidity vs firm characteristics. Multinomial logit regressions.  
 
  
 
Tenure structure  Bonus  Perceived competition  Price competition 
 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
Low-skilled blue-collar (%)  0.625***  0.785  0.517***  0.944  0.489***  0.879  0.507***  0.995 
  (0.008)  (0.213)  (0.000)  (0.723)  (0.000)  (0.494)  (0.000)  (0.978) 
High-skilled blue-collar (%)  0.707*  0.988  0.705**  0.572***  0.710*  1.010  0.723*  0.627** 
  (0.062)  (0.955)  (0.046)  (0.002)  (0.050)  (0.961)  (0.066)  (0.014) 
Low-skilled white-collar (%)  0.747  0.691  0.723  0.555**  0.552**  0.661  0.814  0.684* 
  (0.226)  (0.142)  (0.174)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.104)  (0.369)  (0.091) 
Labour cost (%)  1.425*  1.329  1.614**  1.366*  1.540**  1.317  1.767***  1.277 
   (0.091)  (0.182)  (0.013)  (0.066)  (0.029)  (0.179)  (0.004)  (0.164) 
Outside contract only  0.954  1.106  1.039  1.175  1.034  1.335*  1.017  1.185 
   (0.734)  (0.510)  (0.773)  (0.240)  (0.803)  (0.056)  (0.904)  (0.257) 
Firm-level contract only  0.991  1.446**  1.120  1.516***  1.033  1.604***  1.076  1.627*** 
   (0.953)  (0.015)  (0.432)  (0.002)  (0.826)  (0.002)  (0.627)  (0.001) 
Both contracts  0.608**  1.546**  0.737*  1.286  0.675**  1.591**  0.759  1.320 
   (0.013)  (0.026)  (0.067)  (0.155)  (0.023)  (0.012)  (0.110)  (0.132) 
Permanent workers (%)  1.366  1.001  1.631**  1.078  1.580*  1.051  1.497*  1.044 
   (0.200)  (0.997)  (0.047)  (0.669)  (0.050)  (0.824)  (0.080)  (0.809) 
Size = 20–49  1.248*  1.032  1.145  1.055  1.152  1.141  1.191  1.037 
  (0.083)  (0.802)  (0.265)  (0.573)  (0.242)  (0.268)  (0.150)  (0.708) 
Size = 50–199  1.388***  0.811  1.301**  0.903  1.196  0.934  1.376***  0.955 
  (0.009)  (0.107)  (0.027)  (0.270)  (0.130)  (0.578)  (0.006)  (0.615) 
Size = 200+  1.434**  0.958  1.184  0.972  1.072  0.888  1.181  0.959 
  (0.016)  (0.764)  (0.226)  (0.768)  (0.626)  (0.392)  (0.236)  (0.670) 
Sector = Energy  0.450  0.967  0.374  1.658***  0.604  1.221  0.245  1.767** 
  (0.139)  (0.920)  (0.106)  (0.007)  (0.364)  (0.579)  (0.176)  (0.017) 
Sector = Construction  0.772*  1.128  0.827  1.001  0.773*  1.044  0.670**  1.072 
  (0.094)  (0.440)  (0.216)  (0.996)  (0.095)  (0.791)  (0.013)  (0.647) 
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Sector = Trade  0.818  1.004  0.802*  0.961  0.760**  1.018  0.773**  0.941 
  (0.101)  (0.974)  (0.061)  (0.649)  (0.022)  (0.883)  (0.027)  (0.499) 
Sector = Market services  0.845  1.136  0.864  0.955  0.777**  1.037  0.844  0.958 
  (0.147)  (0.293)  (0.157)  (0.562)  (0.019)  (0.739)  (0.108)  (0.605) 
Sector = Financial interm.  0.839  1.401  0.907  1.492  0.794  1.567*  0.814  1.455 
  (0.573)  (0.183)  (0.749)  (0.100)  (0.482)  (0.099)  (0.514)  (0.141) 
Sector = Non-market serv.  0.885  0.686  0.817  0.889  0.975  0.681  0.868  0.636 
  (0.668)  (0.367)  (0.487)  (0.748)  (0.928)  (0.354)  (0.654)  (0.342) 
Tenure 1–5 years (%)  2.593***  0.822                   
   (0.003)  (0.508)                   
Tenure above 5 years (%)  2.719***  1.032                   
   (0.000)  (0.899)                   
Bonus        1.015  1.098             
         (0.883)  (0.196)             
Perceived comp = strong               0.674***  1.128       
              (0.000)  (0.161)       
Perceived comp = weak               0.770*  1.255       
              (0.079)  (0.128)       
Perceived comp = none              0.696  0.662       
              (0.154)  (0.150)       
Price comp = likely                    0.920  0.887 
                    (0.423)  (0.161) 
Price comp = not likely                    0.881  0.851* 
                    (0.261)  (0.089) 
Price comp = not at all                    1.019  1.039 
                    (0.915)  (0.782) 
Observations  6449  6449  10298  10298  7549  7549  9969  9969 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage and real wage rigidity vs flexible wage. The regression includes 
country fixed effects (not shown). Robust P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix 9: Wage rigidity vs competition. Regressions for euro area and non-euro area countries 
 
   Euro area  Non-euro area  Euro area  Non-euro area 
  
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
Low-skilled blue-collar (%)  0.383***  1.465  0.612*  0.471***  0.398***  1.552**  0.629*  0.379*** 
  (0.000)  (0.128)  (0.050)  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.027)  (0.073)  (0.001) 
High-skilled blue-collar (%)  0.777  1.394  0.558**  0.755  0.866  0.842  0.505**  0.561* 
  (0.261)  (0.221)  (0.047)  (0.382)  (0.517)  (0.443)  (0.025)  (0.092) 
Low-skilled white-collar (%)  0.553*  0.878  0.596  0.461*  1.020  0.933  0.647  0.422* 
  (0.075)  (0.673)  (0.122)  (0.075)  (0.948)  (0.785)  (0.201)  (0.064) 
Labour cost (%)  1.642*  1.747**  1.492  0.931  1.776**  1.531**  1.752*  0.816 
   (0.072)  (0.030)  (0.171)  (0.836)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.063)  (0.581) 
Outside contract only  1.176  1.516**  1.620  2.822*  1.197  1.429  1.709  3.389** 
   (0.303)  (0.037)  (0.287)  (0.064)  (0.281)  (0.127)  (0.263)  (0.031) 
Firm-level contract only  2.072**  2.227***  0.832  1.500**  2.416***  2.220***  0.816  1.436* 
   (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.292)  (0.037)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.269)  (0.074) 
Both contracts  0.773  1.829***  0.651  1.592  0.900  1.582*  0.684  1.282 
   (0.215)  (0.010)  (0.245)  (0.269)  (0.611)  (0.078)  (0.327)  (0.593) 
Permanent workers (%)  1.764*  1.036  1.383  1.022  1.644  1.160  1.314  0.711 
   (0.080)  (0.897)  (0.340)  (0.957)  (0.113)  (0.455)  (0.432)  (0.397) 
Size = 20–49  0.951  1.245  1.419*  0.846  1.013  1.043  1.416*  0.810 
  (0.762)  (0.142)  (0.052)  (0.423)  (0.934)  (0.699)  (0.058)  (0.345) 
Size = 50–199  1.088  1.013  1.359*  0.695*  1.345**  0.971  1.407*  0.729 
  (0.594)  (0.934)  (0.091)  (0.089)  (0.050)  (0.770)  (0.065)  (0.152) 
Size = 200+  0.847  0.895  1.479*  0.707  0.995  0.958  1.514*  0.694 
  (0.364)  (0.503)  (0.094)  (0.201)  (0.979)  (0.687)  (0.088)  (0.189) 
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Sector = Energy  1.457  3.125**  0.316  0.396  0.000***  2.178***  0.480  0.664 
  (0.606)  (0.016)  (0.284)  (0.241)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.492)  (0.597) 
Sector = Construction  0.655*  0.842  0.879  1.311  0.475***  0.880  0.859  1.306 
  (0.074)  (0.469)  (0.529)  (0.225)  (0.004)  (0.532)  (0.473)  (0.257) 
Sector = Trade  0.742*  1.235  0.766  0.819  0.731*  0.996  0.835  0.758 
  (0.092)  (0.178)  (0.109)  (0.301)  (0.058)  (0.967)  (0.282)  (0.166) 
Sector = Market services  0.698**  1.006  0.834  1.094  0.873  0.944  0.785  0.921 
  (0.016)  (0.968)  (0.258)  (0.616)  (0.332)  (0.530)  (0.142)  (0.663) 
Sector = Financial interm.  0.893  2.069**  0.691  1.090  0.858  1.780*  0.784  0.877 
  (0.806)  (0.038)  (0.438)  (0.846)  (0.717)  (0.066)  (0.613)  (0.779) 
Sector = Non-market serv.  0.837  0.686        0.811  0.645       
  (0.537)  (0.371)        (0.523)  (0.355)       
Perceived comp = strong   0.763**  1.033  0.581***  1.290*             
  (0.018)  (0.762)  (0.000)  (0.080)             
Perceived comp = weak   0.926  1.158  0.616**  1.388             
  (0.715)  (0.463)  (0.023)  (0.156)             
Perceived comp = none  1.155  0.780  0.260**  0.627             
  (0.636)  (0.514)  (0.014)  (0.277)             
Price comp = likely              0.956  0.889  0.867  0.915 
              (0.744)  (0.225)  (0.372)  (0.657) 
Price comp = not likely              0.825  0.803**  0.951  1.059 
              (0.203)  (0.041)  (0.770)  (0.784) 
Price comp = not at all              1.172  1.032  0.791  1.087 
              (0.465)  (0.840)  (0.449)  (0.796) 
Observations  4319  4319  3230  3230  6982  6982  2987  2987 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage and real wage rigidity vs flexible wage. The regression includes 
country fixed effects (not shown). Robust P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix 10: Wage rigidity vs institutions 
 
  
Collective bargaining 
coverage 
Employment 
protection legislation 
Union effects: High 
coverage by outside 
agreements 
Union effects: 
Medium coverage by 
outside agreements 
Union effects: Low 
coverage by outside 
agreements 
  
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
DNWR/ 
flexible 
DRWR/ 
flexible 
Low-skilled blue-collar (%)  0.553***  1.092  0.541***  1.068  0.588  1.394  0.505**  1.658  0.622*  0.470*** 
  (0.000) (0.605) (0.000) (0.671) (0.116) (0.165) (0.012) (0.149) (0.056) (0.006) 
High-skilled  blue-collar  (%)  0.755*  0.681**  0.716**  0.688**  1.105  0.705  0.704  1.367  0.537**  0.751 
  (0.094) (0.042) (0.042) (0.032) (0.777) (0.186) (0.175) (0.381) (0.032) (0.367) 
Low-skilled white-collar (%)  0.696  0.708  0.722  0.685*  2.079  0.794  0.566  1.013  0.630  0.471* 
  (0.119) (0.132) (0.140) (0.069) (0.113) (0.473) (0.143) (0.973) (0.160) (0.083) 
Labour cost (%)  1.530**  1.251  1.572**  1.378*  2.005*  1.629**  1.432  1.634  1.453  0.996 
   (0.026) (0.207) (0.015) (0.051) (0.066) (0.030) (0.274) (0.190) (0.195) (0.991) 
Outside contract only        1.004  1.268*  0.915  0.794**  1.087  1.345  1.485  2.558* 
         (0.974)  (0.091)  (0.587)  (0.019)  (0.594)  (0.142)  (0.374)  (0.091) 
Firm-level contract only        1.126  1.606***       1.680  2.631**  0.884  1.386* 
         (0.394)  (0.001)       (0.108)  (0.013)  (0.467)  (0.086) 
Both contracts        0.740*  1.451**       0.565**  1.956*** 0.686  1.500 
         (0.063)  (0.031)       (0.041)  (0.009)  (0.303)  (0.329) 
Permanent workers (%)  1.613**  1.264  0.192**  1.278  0.780  1.086  2.486**  1.611  1.405  0.938 
   (0.041) (0.198) (0.020) (0.731) (0.628) (0.708) (0.012) (0.196) (0.311) (0.874) 
Size = 20–49  1.153  1.079  1.134  1.092  0.870  1.103  1.094  1.132  1.405*  0.844 
  (0.238) (0.441) (0.272) (0.326) (0.531) (0.401) (0.661) (0.551) (0.056) (0.411) 
Size = 50–199  1.166  1.001  1.246**  0.953  0.902  0.998  1.485**  0.981  1.383*  0.678* 
  (0.187) (0.994) (0.048) (0.576) (0.640) (0.986) (0.037) (0.929) (0.069) (0.065) 
Size = 200+  0.989  0.988  1.095  0.977  0.560**  0.989  1.394  0.895  1.540*  0.753 
  (0.935) (0.901) (0.488) (0.798) (0.017) (0.923) (0.125) (0.663) (0.061) (0.283) 
Sector = Energy  0.426  1.710***  0.653  1.634***  1.168  3.048***  1.056  0.000***  0.178*  0.321 
  (0.157) (0.003) (0.385) (0.009) (0.885) (0.000) (0.949) (0.000) (0.096) (0.131) 
Sector = Construction  0.788  1.261  0.777*  1.068  0.096**  0.574*  0.747  1.263  0.912  1.288 
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  (0.127) (0.140) (0.096) (0.648) (0.024) (0.074) (0.240) (0.402) (0.651) (0.250) 
Sector = Trade  0.847  0.943  0.822*  0.976  0.765  1.011  0.764  1.119  0.825  0.762 
  (0.155) (0.515) (0.082) (0.770) (0.298) (0.917) (0.176) (0.591) (0.243) (0.150) 
Sector = Market services  0.854  0.962  0.868  0.963  1.001  0.895  0.710*  1.213  0.801  1.017 
  (0.122) (0.637) (0.153) (0.625) (0.995) (0.237) (0.078) (0.378) (0.159) (0.922) 
Sector = Financial interm.  0.611  1.278  0.816  1.451  1.144  1.750  0.735  1.424  0.748  0.957 
  (0.162) (0.391) (0.499) (0.116) (0.821) (0.133) (0.563) (0.496) (0.541) (0.921) 
Sector = Non-market serv.  1.057  0.906  0.983  0.814  2.023  1.892  0.876  0.823       
  (0.842)  (0.799)  (0.948)  (0.572)  (0.408)  (0.533)  (0.655)  (0.645)      
Covered workers (%)   1.010  1.273**                        
   (0.922)  (0.030)                        
Permanent workers (%) * 
EPL        2.030***  0.957                   
         (0.003)  (0.864)                  
Observations  10309  10309  11837  11837  5161  5161  2256  2256  3272  3272 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimated odds ratios for nominal wage rigidity vs flexible wage and real wage rigidity vs flexible wage. The regression includes 
country fixed effects (not shown). Robust P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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